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This article discusses the need for more satisfactory implicit measures in consumer psychology 
and assesses the theoretical foundations, validity, and value of the Implicit Association Test 
(IAT) as a measure of implicit consumer social cognition. Study 1 demonstrates the IAT’s sen­
sitivity to explicit individual differences in brand attitudes, ownership, and usage frequency, 
and shows their correlations with IAT-based measures of implicit brand attitudes and brand re­
lationship strength. In Study 2, the contrast between explicit and implicit measures of attitude 
toward the ad for sportswear advertisements portraying African American (Black) and Euro­
pean American (White) athlete–spokespersons revealed different patterns of responses to ex­
plicit and implicit measures in Black and White respondents. These were explained in terms of 
self-presentation biases and system justification theory. Overall, the results demonstrate that 
the IAT enhances our understanding of consumer responses, particularly when consumers are 
either unable or unwilling to identify the sources of influence on their behaviors or opinions. 
Understanding of consumers’ mental states has been a chief 
concern in consumer research. It is therefore not surprising 
that psychology has had a profound paradigmatic impact on 
the field. Like psychologists, consumer researchers have re­
lied heavily on “self-reports of attitudes, stereotypes and 
other beliefs, preferences, values, goals and motives” 
(Kihlstrom, 2004, p. 195). Although these procedures have 
been efficient, convenient, and economical measures and 
have brought great advances, the advances have been contin­
gent on key assumptions. It has been assumed generally that 
“people were aware of their attitudes, beliefs, and values that 
guided their behavior, and that they would be willing to re-
Often, consumers are aware of their own attitudes or opin­
ions but are reluctant to share them with unfamiliar research­
ers. This is usually true of questions that are highly charged, 
where responses might be embarrassing or where people feel 
compelled to produce a socially acceptable answer 
(Kihlstrom, 2004). Then, consumers might resort to impres­
sion management and report distorted answers. For example, 
“dark side behavior” research is often susceptible to socially 
desirable responding (Mick, 1996). Self-report measures of 
constructs such as vanity (Netemeyer, Burton, & 
Lichtenstein, 1995) and stigmatized behaviors (e.g., compul­
sive shopping, Mowen & Spears, 1999; or smoking, Rozin & 
veal them if asked appropriately” (Kihlstrom, 2004, p. 195). 
Of course, these assumptions might not always be valid, as 
people are sometimes unable or unwilling to reveal their 
Singh, 1999) may also be prone to response management. 
Procedures that could measure these constructs at the im­
plicit level would provide quantifiable insights into the un­
opinions (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). derlying automatic associations that consumers make. In ad­
dition, a substantial portion of consumption is shaped by 
cognitive processes that are outside conscious awareness 
(e.g., Bargh, 2002; Zaltman, 2000) and have influences that 
consumers do not realize (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). Re­
cently, psychologists have shown renewed interest in this is­
sue and have “reclaimed” the importance of the unconscious 
(Greenwald, 1992; Weinberger, 2000). Although implicit so­
cial cognition is still in its infancy, a surge of research has led 
to measurement and theoretical advances (Fazio & Olson, 
2003). We believe that consumer psychology should build on 
this movement and that more research should investigate im­
plicit consumer social cognition:1 that is, the automatic con­
sumer affective processes and cognitions that exist outside of 
conscious awareness or control. 
However, measurement issues have often constrained our 
understanding of implicit effects. Although researchers agree 
that “valid measurement is the sine qua non of science” (Pe­
ter, 1979, p. 6), a lack of satisfactory implicit measurement 
tools has led consumer psychologists to depend a lot on ex­
plicit measures. For example, research on incidental ad expo­
sure (Janiszewski, 1993; Shapiro, 1999) assumes that prefer­
ences are “formed independently of conscious processing” 
(Janiszewski, 1988, p. 200). At the same time, however, this 
research relies on self-report measures of attitude toward the 
ad (Aad), recognition, and familiarity. In sum, whether it be 
to circumvent the willingness or awareness issue, the avail­
ability of valid implicit measures has become a theoretical 
imperative (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). 
In this article, we (a) review the strengths and limitations 
of past explicit and implicit measures; (b) assess the prop­
erties and relevance of the Implicit Association Test (IAT; 
Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) as a measure of 
implicit consumer social cognition; (c) offer empirical tests 
of the IAT’s validity and sensitivity in a consumer behavior 
setting; and (d) investigate whether the IAT is able to detect 
consumer behavior effects that explicit measures cannot. 
First, we discuss the merits and shortcomings of existing 
measures. We next describe the IAT from procedural and 
conceptual perspectives, examine its validity and limita­
tions and explain how it can be used in consumer research. 
Then, in Study 1, we test the validity and convergence of 
IAT-based measures of implicit brand attitudes and con-
sumer–brand relationship strength, contrasting them with 
explicit measures of brand attitude, brand ownership, and 
brand usage in a context where consumers would be willing 
and able to share their evaluations (i.e., computer brands). 
In Study 2, we report a divergence between IAT-based and 
explicit measures of attitudes toward sportswear advertise­
1Although published research suggests that there is not complete agree­
ment on terminology, we use implicit versus explicit as a key delineation for 
both measures and processes. This is consistent with the use of these terms in 
social psychology, cognitive psychology, and consumer psychology. Other 
labels have also been used: for example, unaware versus aware, unobtrusive 
versus obtrusive, unconscious versus conscious, automatic versus con­
trolled, and indirect versus direct. Although related, these terms have 
slightly different theoretical underpinnings. We believe that the labels im­
plicit versus explicit are most appropriate for this research, and are consis­
tent with the terminology used in recent review articles (Fazio & Olson 
2003; Kihlstrom, 2004). 
ments that portray African American and White athletes. In 
this experiment, unlike the first, some respondents were 
likely to exert control over their answers to conform to so­
cial desirability. In a subsequent follow-up study, we elimi­
nate alternative explanations for these findings and confirm 
that IAT effects are driven by evaluations of the category 
being tested rather than evaluations of specific category ex­
emplars. Finally, we discuss theoretical and measurement 
implications of the results. 





Most research on consumer social cognition has used ex­
plicit measures of attitudes. There is ample evidence that 
these measures satisfy important psychometric criteria such 
as usefulness and efficiency (Mischel, 1968). Nevertheless, 
they have limitations. The measures (e.g., Likert-type or se­
mantic differential scales) typically reference a target object 
in the participant’s personal history (Jacoby, Lindsay, & 
Toth, 1992). Thus, they assume that the participant (a) has 
already formed an opinion or is able to construct one on the 
spot (see Schwarz & Bohner, 2001, for a discussion of the 
constructionist perspective); (b) is aware of (i.e., has access 
to) his or her attitude; and (c) is willing to share it accu­
rately with the researcher. This article does not debate 
whether attitudes are formed, stored, and retrieved or 
whether they are constructed online. It would nonetheless 
be tenuous to assume that all conditions can be met in all 
situations (Jacoby et al., 1992). For our purpose, the last 
two conditions are critical. 
Awareness and willingness issues can be apparent in sev­
eral ways. First, individuals who have never heard of a topic 
are unlikely to have formed a prior attitude. To avoid appear­
ing ignorant, however, they might still answer the question 
(Hawkins & Coney, 1981). In other cases, previously formed 
attitudes may not be easily accessible to the individual 
(Fazio, 1986; Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986). 
Thus, although individuals have a previously formed opin­
ion, they report a newly created one. In addition, even if par­
ticipants can identify a prior experience, they may be un­
aware of its influence, hence providing inaccurate reports 
(Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). Also, respondents might pur­
posefully distort their answers for social-desirability or im­
age-management reasons. Distortions are especially likely 
when an accurate response is seen as either violating social 
norms such as politeness or prejudice (Demo, 1985; Dovidio 
& Fazio, 1992), jeopardizing one’s self-image (Dovidio & 
Fazio; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Sirgy, 1982), or going 
against the stereotypical answer (Haire, 1950). In short, no 
explicit measure can truly avoid the influence of respondents’ 
control. 
Implicit Measures 
Because explicit measures are subject to conscious and un­
conscious representations, implicit measures should uncover 
different associations (Banaji & Hardin, 1996; Devine, 1989; 
Greenwald et al., 1998). In other words, implicit measures 
are not “explicit measures without bias’ and they do not al­
ways assess constructs identical to those assessed by explicit 
measures. Although related, the two types of measures stem 
from different information processing streams and appear 
linked to activations in different regions of the brain 
(Cunningham, Johnson, Gatenby, Gore, & Banaji, 2003). 
However, several factors, such as the type of object being as­
sessed, self-presentation, or attitude elaboration, can influ­
ence the correlation between them (Nosek & Banaji, 2002). 
The exact nature of implicit attitudes and measures is sub­
ject to debate (e.g., see Banaji, 2001, for a fervent essay on 
this issue; or Kihlstrom, 2004, for an alternative perspective). 
Part of the controversy stems from conceptual issues. Some 
measures can be characterized as unobtrusive but not as im­
plicit per se. In this restricted sense, they are used when peo­
ple are aware of their attitudes, beliefs, or values but are un­
willing to divulge them. However, these unobtrusive 
measures have no merit if the investigation is concerned with 
the measurement of implicit constructs (Kihlstrom, 2004) 
and the consumer has no awareness of the construct of inter­
est. Whereas implicit measures often can be used instead of 
unobtrusive measures, the opposite is not true. Implicit mea­
sures make no reference to objects in a participant’s personal 
history (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). Instead, they focus a 
participant’s attention on performing some task that can indi­
rectly reveal the underlying construct such that inaccessible 
and closely held attitudes can be measured. For example, 
Greenwald and Banaji (1995) defined implicit attitudes as 
“introspectively unidentified (or inaccurately identified) 
traces of past experience that mediate favorable or unfavor­
able feelings, thoughts, or action toward social objects” (p. 
8). As already mentioned, we should not look at implicit 
measures as a “bona fide pipeline” (Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, 
& Williams, 1995) that allows the measurement of “true” at­
titudes. Indeed, “bona fide pipeline” only indicates that the 
“automatic activation occurs farther upstream than the overt 
response to an explicit measure” (Fazio & Olson, 2003; p. 
304), not that one is true and the other is not. 
Unstructured implicit measures. Generally, implicit 
measures can be categorized as either disguised–unstruc­
tured or disguised–structured (Campbell, 1950). They are 
disguised because participants are aware they are participat­
ing in a study but are typically unaware of what is truly being 
assessed. Response alternatives can range from open and un­
structured to a few structured alternatives (Lemon, 1973). 
Projective measures (e.g., Rorschach Inkblot Test, the The­
matic Apperception Test) are unstructured measures that ask 
participants to react to a deliberately ambiguous stimulus. In 
the process of completing the task, participants project parts 
of themselves (e.g., attitudes, prejudices, fears, etc.) that can 
then be interpreted (e.g., Haire, 1950). 
Sentence or word completion and word association tests 
are also used frequently. They are more structured than pro­
jective techniques because the stimulus is less ambiguous 
and the response options are more focused. Many projective 
techniques have their roots in Freudian psychology, and al­
though they continue to be popular in psychoanalytic circles 
and in some marketing settings (especially in the case of sen­
tence completion, word association, or collages), all have se­
rious shortcomings. Even as projective techniques were in­
tended to help measurement in situations where respondents 
do not know something or are unable to communicate it 
(Rapaport, Gill, & Schafer, 1968), these measures often lack 
convergent validity and are poor psychometric instruments 
(Lilienfeld, Wood, & Garb, 2001). Further, specific conclu­
sions (other than rich qualitative descriptions) can often be 
flawed because of difficulties in coding and interpretation of 
qualitative data (Churchill, 1995). Thus, their use should be 
discouraged in causal, normative, or prescriptive settings 
where specific and accurate measurements are needed. 
Structured implicit measures. By limiting response 
options, structured measures gain objectivity and avoid most 
interpretation problems. With these measures, a participant’s 
attention is focused on the completion of a task (e.g., group­
ing pictures or words) with defined or undefined success cri­
teria. Although these and explicit measures have convergent 
validity, it is difficult to conceal the research goals in these 
tasks (Lemon, 1973), and so image management remains an 
issue. An information test is another type of structured im­
plicit measure. It determines a participant’s knowledge of a 
topic and has clearly defined success criteria. Because a par­
ticipant’s attitude toward a topic should guide the selection 
and retention of knowledge, this test provides an implicit 
measure of that attitude (Campbell, 1950; Churchill, 1995). 
Information tests are robust to social desirability if the pur­
pose can be disguised (Lemon, 1973) but may be confounded 
by need for cognition (Haugvedt, Petty, & Cacioppo, 1992). 
Other measures with defined success criteria and robustness 
to social desirability ask participants to estimate a group’s 
opinion or identify the social norms of an event. However, 
they do not provide any information about the automaticity 
of attitude activation (Dovidio & Fazio, 1992). This is impor­
tant because the stronger the associative network around an 
attitude object, the more automatically the attitude will be ac­
tivated, even if the attitude is weak (Bargh, 1989) or not con­
sciously held (Fazio, 1986; Fazio et al., 1986). 
Sequential priming (Bargh, Chaiken, Govender, & Pratto, 
1992; Fazio et al., 1986) is a structured implicit measure that 
does not suffer some of the previously mentioned limitations. 
In these tasks, participants classify (target) words into cate­
gories whereas the effect of the preceding (prime) stimulus 
on classification speed is observed. A typical priming effect 
is that the participant’s speed of classifying the target is 
greater when the prime is associated with the target than 
when it is not. Priming is flexible and can use verbal or non­
verbal (e.g., pictures, shapes, faces) stimuli (Tulving & 
Schacter, 1990). Variations of classic priming research have 
been used to consider attitude activation. Response latencies 
in the course of classifying target words as positive or nega­
tive in evaluation are treated as measures of automatic atti­
tude activation with the assumption that the “effect varies as a 
function of associative strength” (Fazio, 2001, p. 123). 
Effects of priming have been identified using both sublim­
inal and conscious level exposures (e.g., Fazio et al., 1986; 
Greenwald, Klinger, & Liu, 1989). As Bargh (1994) noted, 
“what matters more than whether one is aware of a stimulus 
event is whether one is aware of the potential influence of 
that event on subsequent experience and judgments” (p. 15). 
Applications have included the following: the effect of tele­
vision programming on perceptions of social reality (Shrum, 
Wyer, & O’Guinn, 1998); contextual effects on print (Yi, 
1993) and television advertising (Schmitt, 1994); and racial 
attitudes and prejudice (Devine, 1989; Kawakami, Dion, & 
Dovidio, 1998). 
Priming research has also established limitations for the 
measure. In particular, effects can be detected even with 
weak primes, and the recency of prior access to the attitude 
toward the prime might affect priming results by increasing 
the activation level of the association (Bargh et al., 1992). 
Also, priming measures often have relatively low internal 
consistency and test–retest reliability (both often below .3). 
In this case, priming measures are relatively insensitive to in­
dividual differences (Bargh et al., 1992; Chaiken & Bargh, 
1993). Finally, priming might have more value as a depend­
ent measure (where larger between groups experimental ef­
fects with minimal between-subject variance are desired) 
than as an independent variable where more between-sub­
jects variance is needed (Kihlstrom, 2004). 
Summary. Researchers in consumer psychology often 
need implicit measures of attitude when consumers are either 
unaware or unwilling to reveal their opinions. However, em­
pirical advances may have been limited by psychometric 
shortcomings of the measures that have been employed. Con­
sumer research would benefit from measures that display 
greater convergent validity, reliability, sensitivity to individ­
ual differences, and resilience to the effects of image man­
agement and attitude accessibility. The IAT is examined as a 
prospective solution to these measurement problems. 
THE IMPLICIT ASSOCIATION TEST 
The IAT, which was formally introduced in 1998 (Greenwald 
et al.), has gained rapid recognition (Kihlstrom, 2004) and 
has become the most well-known implicit measure in psy­
chology (Fazio & Olson, 2003). The IAT has been used to 
measure product attitudes (Maison, Greenwald, & Bruin, 
2001, 2004) and various implicit constructs in social psy­
chology (see Fazio & Olson 2003; Greenwald et al., 2002; or 
Kihlstrom, 2004, for reviews). To date, however, consumer 
psychologists have not thoroughly probed the relevance, va­
lidity, and general value of this measure. We first examine the 
basic mechanics of the IAT and discuss the theoretical foun­
dations of its measurement applications. We then turn our at­
tention to more specific measurement issues including face, 
content, and external validity and reliability. Finally, we dis­
cuss some limitations and pending issues. 
Conceptual and Measurement Description 
The IAT is based on the premise that attitudes, stereotypes, 
self-concepts, and self-esteem can be defined as associations 
between concepts (Greenwald et al., 2002). This theoretical 
approach is consistent with the associative network view of 
memory (Anderson & Bower, 1973; Collins & Loftus, 1975) 
and the description of an attitude as the association between 
an attitude–object and a valence concept (Fazio, 1995; Fazio, 
Chen, McDonel, & Sherman, 1982). Therefore, the IAT was 
developed to measure the relative strength of automatic asso­
ciation between concepts. For example, the first demonstra­
tion of the IAT (Greenwald et al., 1998) compared the rela­
tive strength of the association between flowers versus 
insects (the target concepts) and positive versus negative va­
lence. Persons with a more favorable attitude toward flowers 
than insects possessed a stronger automatic association of 
“flower” with “positive” than of “insect” with “positive.” Be­
sides its ability to measure relative favorableness, the IAT has 
been shown to be a broader measure, for instance, in the mea­
surement of the association between one’s concept of self 
and other constructs (e.g., women possess stronger IAT-mea­
sured associations between “me” and “feminine” than be­
tween “me” and “masculine;” Greenwald & Farnham, 2000). 
Modus Operandi 
Based on computer-mediated response latency measurement 
protocols, the IAT measure is computed by comparing the 
relative response times associated with several categorization 
tasks. Assume for purposes of illustration that you are an en­
thusiastic New York Yankees fan who has a general distaste 
for the New York Mets (two contrasted attitude–object con­
cepts), and that our purpose is to gauge the relative strength 
of the automatic association between yourself and the Yan­
kees versus yourself and the Mets. For this task, we might use 
two pairs of concepts: “Yankees” versus “Mets,” and “self” 
versus “others.” For each of the four concepts, we identify a 
series of words or pictures to use as exemplars. For example, 
a photo of a Yankees uniform would be an exemplar of “Yan­
kees,” whereas “me” would be an exemplar of “self.” In the 
first category discrimination task, several exemplars of the 
Yankees and Mets are randomly presented with instructions 
to categorize each stimulus as representing either the cate­
gory “Yankees” or “Mets” by pressing either a specific left or 
right key on your computer keyboard. In the second discrimi­
nation task, exemplars of “self” and “others” are randomly 
presented with instructions to categorize them as represent­
ing “self” or “others” by pressing the appropriate left or right 
keys. 
After completing several trials of these first two tasks, you 
are asked to complete a new discrimination task where all 
four categories are now combined. In this task, you are pre­
sented with stimuli representing one of the four concepts 
(“self,” “others,” “Yankees,” or “Mets”), and instructed to 
press the left key if the stimulus exemplifies either the “self” 
or “Yankees,” and the right key if the stimulus represents ei­
ther the “others” or “Mets.” Thus, “Yankees” and “self” share 
one response key, and the “Mets” and “others” share the 
other key. Finally, after some additional practice trials to fa­
miliarize yourself with new key assignments for one of the 
categorization tasks (in this case, “Mets” vs. “Yankees”), you 
perform a new combined categorization task in which the 
categorization of “Mets” or “self” is done with the left key, 
and the categorization of “Yankees” or “others” is done with 
the right one. If you are a real Yankees fan and identify with 
the team, you should find the first combined categorization to 
be easier than the second one. You should also be faster at 
classifying “Yankees” and “self” exemplars when both cate­
gories share the same response key (and “Mets” and “others” 
share the second response key) than when the key assign­
ments are reversed. The difference between your average re­
sponse time in the second combined task and your average 
response time in the first combined task is the IAT effect. Its 
magnitude and arithmetic sign can be interpreted as a mea­
sure of the relative automatic association between yourself 
and the Yankees, versus yourself and the Mets. 
What Does or Can the IAT Measure? 
As the use of the IAT develops, we must consider the scope of 
the constructs that the measure can assess in psychology, and 
in consumer research in particular. According to “A Unified 
Theory of Implicit Attitudes, Stereotypes, Self Esteem, and 
Self-Concept” (Greenwald et al., 2002), a person’s social 
knowledge structure can be represented by an associative net­
work of concepts and nodes, with social constructs conceptu­
alizedassetsofassociations.Conceptscanbepersons,groups, 
or attributes (including the positive and negative valence at­
tributes). In a typical knowledge structure, the concept of self 
is at the center and is connected to other social concepts 
(Greenwald et al., 2002). The IAT provides valid measures of 
implicit associations in this type of structure and affords data 
that explicit measures cannot (Greenwald et al., 2002). Over­
all, the IAT can provide implicit measures of automatic atti­
tudes, self-concepts, self-esteems, and stereotypes. 
It follows that the IAT can be used to measure implicit 
consumption-related constructs in an associative consumer 
social knowledge structure. Figure 1 represents a hypotheti­
cal structure for a visual artist computer user. The consumer 
is at the center of the structure; general (persons, groups, or 
attributes) and positive–negative-valence concepts are in­
cluded. The nodes depict concepts and the line thickness de-
FIGURE 1 Hypothetical consumer social knowledge structure for a computer consumer. The consumer is at the center; the attribute, person, and group 
concepts are represented in the ovals. The positive and negative attribute valence concepts (two especially important attribute concepts) are represented 
by the + and – sign rectangles. The thickness of the links between concepts represents the strength of the automatic association between concepts. 
notes the strength of automatic concept associations. In this 
example, the consumer has a positive attitude toward Apple 
Computers based on positive associations with this concept 
(direct and indirect positive associations). Also, because Ap­
ple is directly linked to the concept of “self” and the associa­
tion is strong, it can be assumed that there is a strong implicit 
brand identification or relationship. The opposite is true for 
the association with the competing brand, Microsoft, which 
is unrelated to self and has a negative valence. 
A consumer social knowledge structure can also incorpo­
rate associations for brand image and brand personality. In 
our example, Microsoft’s image is related to work (strong as­
sociation) and computer viruses (weaker association) and 
Apple is perceived to have a smart personality. From a prod­
uct management perspective, a consumer knowledge struc­
ture can capture implicit product perceptions and categoriza­
tions and can depict associations between products (e.g., 
complementarity, compatibility, or substitutability). It can 
also reflect associations between a consumer, a product, and 
a peer group. Figure 1, for example, shows that this consumer 
has a strong connection between Apple and her friends (in 
particular, Simone). Finally, connections between Jeff 
Goldblum (a strongly positively evaluated person in this 
case), an ad that features him as an Apple spokesperson, and 
the brand, could be a result of ad exposure and can show af­
fect transfer (from the positive attitude toward the spokesper­
son, to attitude toward the ad, to brand attitude) and advertis­
ing effectiveness. Although Figure 1 does not provide an 
exhaustive account of all the consumer behavior constructs 
that might be found in a knowledge structure, it points out 
that this representation is flexible and comprehensive. The 
IAT provides a means to measure the relative strengths of the 
automatic associations between constructs in the structure 
(e.g., an assessment of implicit attitudes toward Apple versus 
Microsoft). 
Validity and Psychometric Issues 
Despite its conceptual and theoretical relevance, the general 
validity and reliability of the IAT must be assessed. Although 
the IAT has received rapid and extensive support (Devine, 
2001), several issues remain to be addressed (for reviews, see 
Cunningham, Preacher, & Banaji, 2001; Fazio & Olson, 
2003; Greenwald & Farnham, 2000; Greenwald & Nosek, 
2001; Kihlstrom, 2004). In this section, we consider several 
specific issues and apply customary measurement criteria 
(Netemeyer & Bearden, 1998) to the potential use of the IAT 
in consumer research. Finally, unresolved issues about the 
measurement technique are discussed. 
Does the IAT correlate with explicit measures? A ba­
sic question concerns the relation between an IAT-based 
measure and its explicit counterpart. Ever since the early pre­
sentation of the IAT (Greenwald et al., 1998), researchers 
have claimed that IAT and self-report measures capture dis­
tinct but correlated constructs (Greenwald & Farnham, 
2000). The constructs are typically related because of their 
common antecedents. Although the correlation between ex­
plicit measures and IAT is sometimes quite high (e.g., .69 in a 
2000 presidential election IAT; Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald, 
2002a), in other cases, it is low and not significant (Nosek & 
Banaji, 2002).2 Still, the divergence of the constructs creates 
the potential for implicit and explicit measures to comple­
ment each other in predicting behavior (as observed by Mai-
son et al., 2004). 
It is nevertheless important to understand when IAT-based 
measures will be more or less correlated with their explicit 
counterparts. A review of empirical IAT findings suggests 
that the correlation between explicit and IAT measures can be 
limited by (a) response factors (e.g., inaccuracy in self-report 
due to impression management for sensitive questions or the 
type of object being assessed); (b) introspective factors (e.g., 
inaccuracy in self-reports because of respondents’poor intro­
spection of their own attitudes or limited attitude elabora­
tion); and (c) a lack of variance with some attitudes which 
can be homogeneous across a specific population (Green­
wald & Nosek, 2001; Nosek & Banaji, 2002). The last argu­
ment is statistical in nature and the first two point out psycho­
logical factors. Consumer psychologists should consider 
how these moderating factors could be applicable in a con­
sumer domain, and future research should aim at providing 
further empirical evidence of these effects and conditions. 
Also related to this discussion are the issues of convergent 
and discriminant validity. First, IAT measures converge with 
semantic priming measures of association strength 
(Cunningham et al., 2001; Mellott & Greenwald, 2000; 
Rudman & Kilianski, 2000). Second, confirmatory factor 
analysis has shown discriminant validity of implicit and ex­
plicit self-esteem and gender self-concept (Greenwald & 
Farnham, 2000). In addition, physiological measures (func­
tional magnetic resonance imaging, or fMRI) have shown 
that IAT effects are linked to activation of the amygdala (a 
subcortical structure associated with emotional learning and 
evaluation) but not with other regions of the brain typically 
involved in explicit processing (Cunningham et al., 2003, 
Phelps et al., 2000). Evidence of this discriminant ability has 
been demonstrated in research showing that (a) prejudice 
against female job applicants was associated with IAT-as­
sessed gender stereotypes, but not explicit gender stereotypes 
measures (Rudman & Glick, 2001); or (b) even when impres­
2A correlation of .5 or more should be seen as high. It approaches the 
maximum value obtainable given the limitations imposed by unreliability of 
the component measures. For example, in a latent variable analysis (e.g., 
confirmatory factory analysis), the disattenuated correlation between im­
plicit and explicit measures of the types used in these studies might be on the 
order of r = .7 (or even higher). In a setting of such purified measures, the 
variance not accounted for by a hypothesized implicit–explicit latent vari­
able correlation (of .7 in this example) should be understood as real differ­
ences between the psychological constructs assessed by the two types of 
measures. 
sion management or inaccessibility are not a concern, IAT 
measures of attitude can explain variance in consumption be­
havior over and above that accounted for by explicit mea­
sures (Maison et al., 2004). 
Is the IAT reliable? Test–retest reliabilities of the IAT 
average about .60 (Greenwald et al., 2002) and IAT measures 
have high internal consistency (alpha about equal to .80 and 
often higher; Greenwald & Nosek, 2001). Also, the measure 
is resistant to several types of procedural artifacts. Spe­
cifically, the IAT effect is independent of (a) which hand is 
assigned to the pleasant category; (b) variability in the num­
ber of items used to represent categories; (c) the familiarity of 
the items used to represent categories (except for items with 
extremely low familiarity levels; Brendl, Markman, & 
Messner, 2001; Greenwald & Nosek; Rothermund & 
Wentura, 2001); (d) variability in the response–stimulus in­
terval; and (e) the order of the mixed categorization tasks (as 
long as there is counterbalancing of the order in the study; 
Greenwald & Nosek). In addition, IAT effects have limited 
sensitivity to differences in how incorrect responses and 
nonnormal response latency distributions are treated (Green­
wald & Nosek). 
Is the IAT sensitive to context effects? Based on a 
review of IAT research, Greenwald and Farnham (2000) con­
cluded that “IAT measures can be influenced in theoretically 
expected fashion by procedures that might be expected to in­
fluence automatic attitudes or stereotypes” (p. 1023). For ex­
ample, viewing photos of admirable members of stigmatized 
groups and despised members of nonstigmatized groups re­
duced implicit negative attitudes toward the stigmatized 
groups (Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2000). Consequently, this 
sensitivity to situational and contextual manipulations re­
quires further elaboration and explanation. 
A special section of the November 2001 issue of the Jour­
nal of Personality and Social Psychology has explored these 
malleability and invariance issues. Although the implications 
of these articles are not unequivocal, they converge on the 
conclusion that the IAT should not be regarded as measuring 
a construct that is permanent or fixed (Devine, 2001). The 
IAT’s susceptibility to these effects is not an indication of its 
failure to measure “stable” opinions. Indeed, because of its 
responsiveness to research manipulations, the IAT can be 
useful as a dependent measure, and it can be used to deter­
mine whether associations among specified concepts are 
consistent with theory. Besides, the IAT is less sensitive to in­
structions to fake than are explicit measures (Asendorpf, 
Banse, & Mücke, 2002; Banse, Seise, & Zerbes, 2001). 
An explanation for the IAT responsiveness to contextual 
manipulations is that social concepts like male, female, Afri­
can American, White, Asian, young., old, and so forth, exist 
not only as memory prototypes, but also as subtypes that may 
be different in valence from the prototypes. This is consistent 
with a multiple-systems view of memory where multiple bins 
encompass separate knowledge structures in long-term 
memory (Wyer & Srull, 1989). The effect of a manipulation 
may be to activate a specific subtype (rather than the default 
prototype), which may then represent the larger category in 
the IAT. Certainly this explanation is consistent with the re­
sults obtained by Dasgupta and Greenwald (2000) that were 
discussed earlier. Further, respondents might not be aware of 
the factors that lead to the activation of a particular knowl­
edge structure. Ultimately, future research on the specific 
theoretical underpinnings and processes of the IAT should 
provide greater understanding of this overall issue. 
Does the IAT measure unconscious processes? Most 
generally, the IAT is assumed to measure association 
strengths. These association strengths can be given more spe­
cific interpretations, depending on the person’s introspective 
access to them and the person’s willingness to report them, as 
demonstrated by Greenwald et al. (2002) and Greenwald and 
Nosek (2001). If the association strengths are ones to which 
the person does not have introspective access, they can be 
called unconscious associations. It is also entirely possible 
that the person has access to them but prefers not to report 
them, in which case the IAT is measuring conscious associa­
tion strengths that people do not wish to make public. Finally, 
when self-reported and IAT-measured associations agree, the 
question as to whether the IAT is measuring something con­
scious becomes inappropriate—the alternatives are not mu­
tually exclusive. 
A recent study by Forehand and Perkins (2003) provides 
evidence that the IAT can measure associations that occur 
outside of conscious awareness. They showed that the voice 
of a celebrity endorser only had a positive effect on implicit 
(IAT-based) attitudes toward the endorsed brand when the 
listener did not recognize the celebrity’s voice in the radio ad 
(i.e., under unawareness condition). In this absence of con­
scious recognition (even on a cue–recall task), Forehand and 
Perkins made a case that the effect observed is due to an un­
conscious transfer of the spokesperson attitude to the brand 
attitude. When recognition was present, listeners became 
aware of the endorser’s influence on their attitude, and cogni­
tive responses (e.g., critical evaluation of the endorsement, 
evaluation of the match with the brand, counterargu­
mentation, etc.) eliminated the endorser effect. This interac­
tion effect with recognition, in conjunction with theoretical 
considerations, allows researchers to claim that associations 
were unconscious. Based on evidence from research in psy­
chology and these recent findings in marketing, it is apparent 
that the IAT can be a measure of implicit consumer social 
cognition as well as an implicit measure of consumer social 
cognition. 
Is the IAT sensitive enough to individual-level differ­
ences? The IAT can detect effects that are considered uni­
versal (e.g., preferences for flowers over insects; Greenwald 
et al., 1998), but also differences that vary between partici­
pant populations. For instance, the IAT has identified differ­
ences between Japanese and Korean Americans’ preferences 
for their own versus others’ ethnicities (Greenwald et al., 
1998), between East and West Germans’ implicit attitudes to­
ward their geographical regions (Kuehnen et al., 2001), and 
between men and women in both their implicit gender 
self-concepts (Greenwald & Farnham, 2000) and their atti­
tudes toward mathematics and the arts (Nosek, Banaji, & 
Greenwald, 2002b). 
Are there pitfalls involved in stimulus selection? A 
primary consideration in selecting stimuli is that they be rea­
sonably familiar (although the IAT effect is robust across rel­
atively wide variations in item familiarity), and unambigu­
ously fall into one of two categories (e.g., pleasant vs. 
unpleasant, Nike vs. Reebok; Greenwald & Nosek, 2001). 
The stimuli that are used to represent the various concepts 
and attributes in the IAT are either drawn from established 
category lists in the literature (e.g., Battig & Montague, 
1969; Bellezza, Greenwald, & Banaji, 1986) or are selected 
on the basis of consensual familiarity and ability to be cate­
gorized easily and consistently. Both words and pictures can 
be used for target-concept or attribute dimensions. 
A question arises as to whether the IAT measures associa­
tions at the category level or at the level of individual exem­
plars. Previous research supports the first possibility (De 
Houwer, 2001; Steffens & Plewe, 2001). For example, Brit­
ish participants’ answers to an IAT in which they were to cat­
egorize names of celebrities as either British or foreign were 
not affected by the affective evaluations of the exemplars 
used for the British (e.g., Princess Diana versus a notorious 
British person who was murdered) or foreign (e.g., Hitler 
versus Einstein) categories (De Houwer, 2001). 
Unresolved Concerns and Limitations 
The aforementioned discussion of the IAT has focused pri­
marily on supporting evidence. A consideration of its limita­
tions should be noted, however, in the context of assessing its 
potential usefulness for consumer research. First, the IAT 
only measures the relative strength of association. For exam­
ple, it assesses the relative favorableness of a respondent’s at­
titudes toward the two target objects being compared but not 
their absolute favorableness. Thus, a favorable IAT toward 
concept “A” versus “B” implies that “A” is preferred to “B.” 
Yet, this could be true either because (a) the respondent likes 
“A” but is neutral toward “B,” or because (b) the respondent 
is neutral toward “A” but dislikes “B.” To this extent, the IAT 
assesses a comparative attitude (i.e., an implicit preference) 
rather than an attitude toward a single object. 
One way to avoid this problem might involve a triangula­
tion of the IAT effects with a known neutral or extremely po­
larized category, thereby disaggregating the relative prefer­
ence in more absolute terms. Also, more direct approaches 
have been proposed. Methods derived from the IAT have 
been developed for single concepts, such as the Go/No-go 
Association Task (Nosek & Banaji, 2001). Although this is a 
promising measure, it is still in the early stages of develop­
ment and application, may not be as adaptive to the range of 
associations that the IAT can measure, and its psychometric 
properties are not yet as well reported as those for the IAT. 
Likewise, priming measures do not have the IAT’s limitation 
of being a relative measure. For example, relative to a neutral 
baseline that might be provided by the absence of a prime (or 
use of a presumably neutral prime), faster responding to posi­
tive targets in the presence of a prime indicates that the prime 
is more strongly associated with positive than with negative 
evaluation. In addition, the priming procedure may allow the 
assessment of evaluative associations of individual words, 
whereas the IAT assesses evaluations at the level of the cate­
gory to which a group of words belongs. However, as dis­
cussed earlier, priming measures have relatively inferior 
psychometric properties. 
The IAT might not be a very efficient measure if one is in­
terested in concepts that can be measured explicitly. There is 
little justification for the use of a complex procedure if a sim­
ilar outcome can be obtained through a questionnaire. The 
IAT will be especially useful in situations in which it can pre­
dict variations in consumer behavior beyond those explained 
by parallel explicit measures. 
Other criticisms have been levied against the IAT. Some 
have suggested that response patterns from the IAT may be 
confounded with other factors such as a person’s cognitive 
ability (McFarland & Crouch, 2002) or respondents’ shift in 
response criterion during the difficult or incompatible mixed 
block of the test (e.g., “insects” with “pleasant;” Brendl et al., 
2001). Brendl et al. argued that the difficulty of the classifica­
tion task (rather than just the underlying attitude) might con­
found IAT findings in some situations. Others have argued 
that the IAT might also capture an attitude object’s environ­
mental or cultural associations instead of just one’s evalua­
tion of the object (Karpinski & Hilton, 2001). Finally, it is 
worth noting that advances in the development of the IAT 
have been driven largely by a concern with measurement is­
sues. A stronger theoretical model of the components of IAT 
effects is necessary to understand better how the IAT mea­
sures association strength and whether it captures more than 
association strength. 
Summary 
Earlier in the article, we argued that consumer psychologists 
would benefit from implicit measures that display conver­
gent validity, are sensitive to individual differences, and are 
insensitive to image management and attitude accessibility 
differences. The IAT is not a “finished” product and there are 
still some psychometric, validity, or procedural questions 
that future research should address. Based on this evidence, 
however, the IAT satisfies the aforementioned measurement 
criteria and possesses properties that are superior to priming 
techniques (e.g., superior test–retest reliability and greater 
sensitivity to individual differences). Further the IAT should 
be superior when predictions are at the category level, 
whereas priming may offer some benefits at the exemplar 
level (Fazio & Olson, 2003). The next step is to provide direct 
empirical support for its validity and value in consumer re­
search. 
RESEARCH SYNOPSIS 
In the empirical section of this article, we use the IAT to mea­
sure consumer-related constructs (e.g., brand attitudes, brand 
relationships, and attitudes toward an ad). As previously dis­
cussed, attitudes can be represented as the association be­
tween an attitude object and a valence attribute concept 
(Greenwald et al., 2002). In addition to evaluative assess­
ments, consumers can also have deep relationships with a 
brand, with the brand becoming part of a person’s self-con­
cept (Belk, 1988; Fournier, 1998; Kleine, Kleine, & Allen, 
1995). Study 1 tests the validity and usefulness of the IAT for 
measuring these constructs across two real brands. In Study 
2, the IAT is used to capture implicit Aad by measuring the 
relative strength of the association between advertisements 
with spokespeople of different ethnicities and the valence at­
tribute concepts (pleasant vs. unpleasant). Although Study 1 
demonstrates the convergent validity of the IAT in a con­
sumer setting, Study 2 shows that the IAT can also reveal dis­
sociations between explicit and implicit consumer social 
cognition. In a follow-up study, we also eliminate alternative 
explanations for our results and demonstrate that the IAT ef­
fect is derived from consumers’ relative evaluations of the 
categories, and not the exemplars used to operationalize the 
categories. 
STUDY 1 
Study 1 was designed to test the efficacy of the IAT as a mea­
sure of brand attitudes and brand relationship strength. To do 
so, we chose a topic where implicit and explicit attitudes 
were expected to converge. Computer platforms (more spe­
cifically, Macintosh [Mac] and Microsoft Windows-based 
[PC] machines) were chosen as the focal targets. We did not 
expect significant differences between explicit and implicit 
attitudes because consumers are likely to know their attitudes 
toward the target and to lack the motivation to disguise them. 
This study was also designed to test the IAT’s utility in mea­
suring consumer–brand relationships (i.e., the degree to 
which a brand is part of a consumer’s self-concept). In this re­
gard, we expected that Mac users would have a stronger rela­
tionship with their preferred brand than would PC users, as 
they often see themselves as part of a close community of us­
ers who have strong ties to the product (Muniz & O’Guinn, 
2001). 
Method 
Procedure and design. Eighty-eight introductory psy­
chology students participated in the study on a voluntary ba­
sis for extra course credit. For each participant, data were col­
lected in two locations (a common room where pa­
per-and-pencil questionnaires were administered and four 
individual rooms where the IAT measures were adminis­
tered). Fifty-six students participated and provided data that 
could be matched across the two parts of the study. In the first 
half of the study, participants completed a three-page survey 
with demographic, vision, and computer proficiency ques­
tions, explicit measures of Mac versus PC attitudes, com­
puter ownership, and usage frequency. Prior research has 
demonstrated that the order of implicit versus explicit mea­
sures has inconsequential effects on the results (Greenwald 
& Farnham, 2000). We nevertheless selected the most con­
servative option and captured the explicit measures first be­
cause the IAT is less likely than explicit measures to be influ­
enced by prior measures. 
In the second half of the study, participants completed two 
IATs in counterbalanced order. One IAT, which consisted of 
the stimulus sequence shown in Figure 2, measured implicit 
attitudes by using stimuli representing Mac and PC comput­
ers (the target concepts) and pleasant and unpleasant words. 
The other IAT measured implicit brand relationships by pair­
ing the Mac and PC-related stimuli with words representing 
the concepts “self” and “other” rather than pleasantness-re­
lated words. Self-related words included “I,” “me,” “my,” and 
“mine;” other-related words included “they,” “them,” “their,” 
and “other.” 
The first IAT we administered consisted of 7 blocks with 
32 trials during the practice blocks and 40 trials during the 
measured blocks. Each trial consisted of the presentation of a 
single stimulus item. The second IAT only required six 
blocks (the block in Step 1 of Figure 2 was unnecessary for 
the second IAT as the Mac versus PC categorization had al­
ready been practiced and the key assignments remained un­
changed for each participant). Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of eight counterbalanced task orders to ac­
commodate three procedural factors (i.e., a 2 × 2 × 2  design): 
whether the brand attitude or brand relationship IAT was ad­
ministered first, whether pleasant or unpleasant were initially 
assigned to the left or right key (in other words, presentation 
order of the favorable versus unfavorable attitude), and 
whether self or other were initially assigned to the left or 
right key. 
Measures. During the IAT, the computer recorded 
participants’ response latencies (in milliseconds) for the 
two measured blocks. Trial number, block, stimuli informa­
tion, and error rates were also recorded. Consistent with 
prior procedures and recommended guidelines established 
for the IAT (Greenwald & Farnham, 2000; Greenwald et 
al., 1998), the first two trials in the measured blocks were 
FIGURE 2 Schematic description of the Implicit Attitude Test (IAT; adapted from Greenwald & Farnham, 2000). The correct response for each sample 
stimulus is indicated by a check mark. The IAT effect is calculated as the difference in average response latencies between the two measurement blocks in 
steps 3 and 5. Complete stimuli included six words for each of the pleasant and unpleasant categories, and five words or pictures for each of the Ap­
ple/Macintosh and PC-type/IBM categories. 
dropped because they are typically longer; latencies longer 
than 3,000 msec were recoded to 3,000 msec, and latencies 
shorter than 300 msec were recoded as 300 msec. After the 
data transformations, the IAT effect was calculated as the 
difference in average response latencies between the third 
and fifth step depicted in Figure 2. A pro-Mac implicit atti­
tude effect occurred when a participant was quicker to cate­
gorize a stimulus when Mac and pleasant shared the same 
response key compared to when Mac and unpleasant shared 
the same key. A self-Mac implicit brand relationship effect 
occurred when a participant was quicker to categorize Mac 
and self together compared to Mac and other. Higher scores 
on the IAT effects described in this study indicate more fa­
vorable implicit attitude and brand relationship toward Mac 
relative to PC. 
Explicit attitudes toward Mac and PC were measured in 
the survey along a 5-item, 7-point semantic differential scale, 
anchored by good–bad, pleasant–unpleasant, inferior–supe­
rior, unsatisfactory–satisfactory, and favorable–unfavorable 
(α = .90 for both Mac and PC scales). Two ownership mea­
sures (Mac and PC) asked participants to indicate how many 
computers of each type they owned. For each brand, usage 
frequency was measured with 9-point semantic differential 
scales anchored by not at all–very frequently. Participants’ 
scores on the explicit attitude, ownership, and usage mea­
sures for PC were subtracted from their Mac scores to gener­
ate a relative measure of Mac versus PC tendencies. Consis­
tent with the IAT effect, higher scores on these measures 
indicated a greater preference for Mac versus PC. 
Results 
Initial analyses tested the effects of the three counterbalanc­
ing factors (e.g., order of the two IATs). None of these factors 
had a significant effect on the IAT results. These null findings 
are consistent with prior studies using the IAT demonstrating 
the robustness of the IAT across several procedural variations 
(Greenwald et al., 1998; Greenwald & Nosek, 2001). There­
fore, the analysis that follows is collapsed across the eight 
procedural conditions. 
A primary concern of this study is the degree to which the 
explicit measures of brand attitudes, ownership, and usage 
were correlated with IAT-based measures of implicit brand 
attitudes and brand relationship. Table 1 illustrates that all of 
the explicit difference measures were significantly positively 
correlated with the IAT-based measures. Thus, under condi­
tions in which participants were not expected to hide their be­
liefs, explicit brand attitudes were strongly correlated to im­
plicit attitudes (r = .50, p < .01) and implicit brand 
relationship (r = .54, p < .01), thereby validating the IAT for 
brand evaluation. Further, both IAT-based and explicit brand 
attitudes were also strongly correlated (r = .69 for both cases) 
with explicit usage measures. 
Individual differences in attitude. Additional analy­
sis was conducted to investigate differences in IAT-based 
measures between pro-Mac and pro-PC respondents. To do 
this, the explicit difference scores for attitude, ownership, 
and usage were dummy-coded. Participants who had re­
ported more favorable Mac explicit attitudes, ownership, or 
usage were assigned a 1, whereas those who had reported 
more favorable reactions to PC-related measures were as­
signed a 0. Participants who were indifferent (that is, whose 
scores on the attitude, ownership, and usage measures were 
the same for PCs and Macs) were excluded from this analy­
sis. This eliminated 11.4%, 20.3%, and 5.6% of the partici­
pants who reported equivalent attitudes, ownership, and us­
age, respectively (note, however, that only the size and not 
the direction of the effects changes if the ambivalent respon­
dents are also kept in the analysis). 
Participants who reported more favorable explicit atti­
tudes, greater ownership, or usage frequencies for a brand 
had significantly faster response latencies when the brand 
was paired with “pleasant” versus “unpleasant,” thereby 
yielding consistency between the implicit and explicit con­
structs. The difference was statistically significant in all six 
comparisons (see Figure 3). Thus, implicit brand attitudes 
were correlated with explicit brand preferences but also were 
sensitive to individual behavioral differences. Further, a 
comparison of implicit attitude effects for PC versus Mac 
TABLE 1
 
Correlations Among Key Variables—Study 1
 
Explicit Brand Computer 
Implicit Brand Attitude Ownership 
Implicit Attitude Relationship (Difference Score) (Difference Score) 
Pearson Correlation n % n % n % n % 
Implicit brand relationship 63 .542** 
Explicit brand attitude (difference score) 54 .504** 54 .307* 
Computer ownership (difference score) 54 .468** 54 .411** 79 .581** 
Computer usage 50 .688** 50 .543** 72 .692** 72 .689** 
Note. High scores on the Implicit Association Test and the explicit difference scores indicate preferences for Macintosh relative to Microsoft Win­
dows-based PC-type computers. 
*p < .05. **p < .01. 
FIGURE 3 Implicit attitude and implicit brand relationship results by explicit attitude, ownership, and usage frequency—Study 1. 
loyalists yielded stronger IAT effects for the Mac groups than 
the PC groups. Whether the data were split by prior attitude, 
ownership, or usage, the average IAT effect for the Mac loy­
alists ranged from 130.28 to 158.8 msec, but ranged only 
from 54.78 to 69.46 msec for the PC group (t > 4.18, p < .001, 
for all three comparisons). These results indicate that attitude 
strength and accessibility were consistently greater for Mac 
loyalists than for PC loyalists. 
Individual differences in brand relationships. A sig­
nificant IAT brand relationship effect was only evident for 
the Mac loyalists, M = 121.1, t(16) = 2.93, p = .01, for explicit 
attitude; M = 157.3, t(13) = 3.10, p < .01 for ownership; M = 
178.6, t(16) = 4.36, p < .001, for usage; see Figure 3). Partici­
pants who reported more favorable explicit attitudes, greater 
ownership, or usage frequencies for Mac had significantly 
faster response when Mac and self were combined as op­
posed to Mac and other. Conversely, PC loyalists’ response 
latencies when PC and other were combined as opposed to 
PC and self were not different (t values ranging from .36 to 
.76). Further, a comparison of implicit brand relationships for 
PC versus Mac loyalists confirmed stronger IAT effects for 
the Mac groups than the PC groups. Whether the data was 
split by prior attitudes, ownership, or usage, t tests confirmed 
higher IAT effect for the Mac group than for the PC group (t > 
3.25, p < .005, for all three comparisons). Together, these re­
sults suggest that owning a Mac is closely related to one’s im­
plicit identity whereas owning a PC is not. 
Discussion 
This study demonstrates the validity of the IAT as an instru­
ment for measuring implicit brand attitudes and brand rela­
tionships. First, in a situation where implicit and explicit con­
structs would be expected to converge, IAT measures of 
brand attitude and brand relationship were strongly corre­
lated with explicit measures of brand attitude, ownership, 
and usage. Furthermore, IAT measures effectively differenti­
ated consumers who reported more favorable explicit atti­
tude, ownership, and usage of one brand versus the other. 
Second, the measurement benefits of the IAT are particularly 
compelling with respect to brand relationships. In Fournier’s 
(1998) terms, Mac users appeared to have a stronger 
self-connection to the brand than did PC users. The strong 
Mac brand relationship might stem from the resistance and 
loyalty that Mac users have developed after years of being a 
small share in the computer world (Wong, 2001) and the 
strong sense of brand community exhibited by Mac users 
(Muniz & O’Guinn, 2001). Because of their minority status, 
Mac users may hold “a socially embedded and entrenched 
loyalty, brand commitment… and even hyper loyalty” 
(Muniz & O’Guinn, p. 427). The IAT results also confirm 
that brands “serve as powerful repositories of meaning pur­
posively and differently employed in the substantiation, cre­
ation, and (re)production of concepts of self in the marketing 
age” (Fournier, p. 365). 
STUDY 2 
The previous study showed that IAT-based measures of brand 
attitudes and relationships are correlated with explicit mea­
sures when consumers have access to their attitudes and are 
willing to share them. This validation of the IAT in a market­
ing context was a necessary step in establishing that the IAT 
is a valid marketing measure. This step is also imperative if 
one is to show that under other conditions, there can be disso­
ciations (i.e., no significant correlations) between explicit 
marketing attitude measures and corresponding IAT mea­
sures. Study 2 provides this demonstration, showing that the 
IAT can uncover consumers’ attitudes that traditional mea­
sures do not detect. In doing so, it demonstrates that explicit 
measures can lead to erroneous conclusions if implicit mea­
sures are not considered. 
In this study, we investigated the topic of the race of adver­
tising spokespeople. Past IAT research has shown that the IAT 
reveals racial biases that explicit measures do not detect 
(Dasgupta & McGhee, 2000; Greenwald et al., 1998). Also, 
there is an extensive body of research dealing with the impact 
of spokespeople on ad persuasion (e.g., Deshpande & 
Stayman, 1994; Heath, McCarthy, & Mothersbaugh, 1994; 
Kamins, 1990). This latter research, however, has been based 
on explicit measures (c.f. Forehand & Perkins, 2003, for an ex­
ception). In Study 2, we focus on attitudes toward the ad (Aad; 
see Brown & Stayman, 1992, and Mitchell & Olson, 1981, for 
reviewsonthis topic)andshowthat theIATcandetectnegative 
racially biased Aad evaluations for respondents that provide 
socially acceptable answers in explicit measures. 
Method 
Procedure and design. Ninety-three undergraduate 
students studying introductory business statistics (consisting 
of 33 men: 46 Whites, 30 Asians, 6 Hispanics, 6 African 
Americans, 5 multiracial or other ethnicities; median age = 
19), participated in the study for course credit. Data for each 
participant were collected during a single experimental ses­
sion lasting under 45 min. As before, explicit measures were 
collected first. Participants completed a survey containing 
demographic, vision, and computer proficiency questions. 
Subsequent analysis showed that all participants could be re­
tained in the sample. The survey also included measures of 
the key construct of interest—attitude toward the ad (5-item 
scale)—both for ads with White spokespeople and ads with 
Black spokespeople. Measurement order was counterbal­
anced, so that half of the participants reported their attitudes 
toward ads that featured White spokespeople first and the 
other half reported attitude toward ads with Black 
spokespersons first. Participants were randomly assigned to 
one of the orders. Then, participants completed a 7-block 
computer-based IAT. Blocks 4 and 7 were the measurement 
blocks (counterbalanced as well). Each block consisted of 32 
(practice) and 40 (measured) trials each. In addition to trial 
number, block number, and stimuli information (see the Ap­
pendix for examples of the stimuli), participants’ response la­
tencies (in milliseconds) and error rates were recorded. 
Stimuli. For this study, we developed 32 ads. These ads 
had a simple layout to allow for quick processing and classi­
fication. They consisted of an athlete’s picture (male or fe­
male) and a brand identifier (name or logo). Based on a brand 
familiarity pretest for 20 brands and with participants from 
the same target population, ads were designed for two differ­
ent athletics footwear brands: an unfamiliar brand—Etonic 
(no participants reported owning Etonic shoes and the brand 
received a 6.72 familiarity rating—where 1 = very familiar 
and 9 =  very unfamiliar) and a familiar brand—New Balance 
(35% of participants reported owning a pair of New Balance 
shoes, and they gave the brand a 2.70 familiarity rating on the 
same scale). We purposely avoided using “megabrands” such 
as Nike, Addidas, or Reebok. Sports were varied, and in­
cluded tennis, basketball, track, golf, and bodybuilding. Four 
ads were constructed for each sport: one with a White athlete 
and a matching one with a Black athlete (none were celebri­
ties), for each of the two brands (32 ads in total: 8 sports × 2 
races × 2 brands). Efforts were made to insure that the Black 
and White race versions of the ads matched each other (see 
the Appendix for stimuli examples—faces of the models are 
masked in this appendix, but were visible to the respondents). 
To minimize differences across ads, they were displayed in 
black and white mode. This study used the same list of pleas­
ant and unpleasant words that were used in Study 1. 
Measures. Explicit measures of Aad were collected 
for both ads with White spokespersons and ads with Black 
spokespersons. This was done using a 6-item semantic differ­
ential scale (interesting–boring, good–bad, pleasant–un­
pleasant, like–dislike, favorable–not favorable, irritating–not 
irritating). These items have been used in past research on 
Aad (MacKenzie & Lutz, 1996; MacKenzie, Lutz, & Belch, 
1986; Mitchell, 1986; Mitchell & Olson, 1981). Scale reli­
ability was high: α (Black) = .93; α (White) = .88. An explicit 
Aad preference was created by taking the difference in score 
between Aad White minus Aad Black. 
Implicit Aad was measured using a similar methodology 
to Study 1. In this study, the IAT effect was measured as the 
difference in average response latencies in the blocks when 
the classification target category (ad with a Black spokesper­
son versus ad with a White spokesperson) shared the same re­
sponse key as the attribute concept (“unpleasant” vs. “pleas­
ant”). Thus, a pro-White spokesperson implicit Aad effect 
occurred when a participant was quicker to categorize stimuli 
when ads with a White spokesperson shared the same re­
sponse key with “pleasant” than when they shared the same 
key with “unpleasant.” 
Results 
Explicit and implicit attitudes toward the ads are shown in 
Figure 4. As expected, there were no significant differences 
between explicit attitudes toward ads with White 
spokespersons, M = 4.67, compared to ads with Black 
spokespersons, M = 4.77, t(92) = –1.32, ns (see Figure 4), 
suggesting that at the explicit level, participants did not ex­
hibit racial preferences. However, implicit measures of Aad 
revealed a strong preference for ads containing White 
spokespersons: IAT effect, M = 244.53 msec, t(92) = 11.25, p 
< .001. Also, the implicit and explicit measures of ad prefer­
ences were not significantly correlated (r = .135, p > .3). This 
dissociation between the implicit and explicit results is fur­
ther confirmed by a significant interaction of race of the 
spokesperson and measurement method in an analysis of 
standardized attitude scores, F(1, 92) = 146.93, p < .001. 
In this subsequent analysis, we considered responses from 
White and Black participant subgroups. As shown in Figure 
5, the subgroups exhibited divergent results. White respon­
dents exhibited a significant “pro-White” IAT preference, M 
= 255.70 msec, t(45) = 14.99, p < .001, but no significant ex­
plicit preference. The Black group indicated preferring ads 
with Black spokespersons at the explicit level, M = 0.75, t(5) 
= 3.40, p < .05, but no significant implicit preference. Fur­
ther, the IAT preference for ads with White spokespersons 
was significantly greater for White respondents, M = 255.70 
msec, than for Black respondents, M = 22.92 msec, F(1, 50) 
= 9.85, p < .005; whereas the explicit preference for ads with 
Black spokespersons was significantly greater for Black re­
spondents, M = 0.78, than for White respondents, M = 0.01, 
F(1, 50) = 7.11, p < .01. 
Further analysis confirmed that there was a significant in­
teraction of ethnicity and measurement method on the re­
vealed preference for “ads with spokespersons of one’s own 
FIGURE 4 Overall explicit and implicit attitudes toward the 
ad—Study 2. 
FIGURE 6 Standardized preferences for ads with spokespersons 
FIGURE 5 Explicit and implicit attitudes toward the ad as a func­
tion of respondent ethnicity—Study 2. 
ethnicity,” F(1, 50) = 21.96, p < .001. The results depicted in 
Figure 6 are based on standardized scores to account for the 
unit difference between the two measures. The findings show 
that White respondents did not acknowledge an explicit pref­
erence (M = –0.02), but implicitly preferred their in-group 
(M = 1.38). Conversely, Black respondents revealed an 
in-group preference at the explicit level (M = 1.11) but not at 
the implicit level (M = –0.12). 
Follow-Up Study 
To further probe the validity of Study 2 results, we conducted 
supplemental data analysis and collected additional data in a 
follow-up experiment. Our main goal was to assess the extent 
to which our results might have been influenced by the stim­
uli used. We first conducted an additional analysis of the 
aforementioned results to show that brand effects did not 
confound the findings. We compared the average latencies 
for classification of the brand stimuli (excluding the pleas­
ant–unpleasant stimuli) and found that there was no brand ef­
fect on implicit Aad, F(1, 185) < 1. Although this null result 
is noteworthy, it is important to show that the absence of 
brand effect was driven by the task (i.e., the respondents were 
from own ethnicity as a function of respondent ethnicity and mea­
surement method—Study 2. A positive number indicates a prefer­
ence for ads with spokespersons from one’s own ethnic group. Zero 
indicates equal preference for ads with White or Black 
spokespersons. A negative number indicates preference for ads with 
spokespersons from the opposite ethnic group. 
focused on the race of the spokesperson classification task) 
rather than by an overall absence of brand preference. 
We therefore designed a follow-up IAT experiment using 
the same stimuli as before, but asked new participants to clas­
sify the ads based on the brand (Etonic vs. New Balance). 
Fifty-four respondents from the same participant pool partic­
ipated. They matched the first sample in terms of demo­
graphics. The IAT effect was significant, M = 125.52 msec, 
t(53) = 5.45, p < .001, showing an overall preference for New 
Balance over Etonic. However, the IAT effect was not contin­
gent on the race of the spokesperson, F(1, 107) < 1. 
Discussion 
Study 1 demonstrated the validity of the IAT as a measure of 
implicit brand attitudes and brand relationships, showed cor­
relations with explicit measures, and established its individ­
ual level sensitivity. Conversely, Study 2 showed that the IAT 
is also a useful measurement for testing effects that explicit 
measures do not uncover. In this regard, explicit measures of 
Aad may have reflected views that participants wished to 
present (i.e., a potential distortion to avoid violating social 
norms; see Demo, 1985; Dovidio & Fazio, 1992), whereas 
the implicit measures reflected more uncontrollable auto­
matic associations. For example, White respondents evi­
denced an implicit preference for ads with White 
spokespersons, suggesting that the absence of difference at 
the explicit level can stem from a desire for social correct­
ness. 
Also, the Black group showed a lack of implicit in-group 
preference, in a manner consistent with System Justification 
Theory (Jost & Banaji, 1994). This theory predicts that low 
status groups are more likely to internalize and accept their 
condition and this can lead to in-group devaluation. Although 
not always measurable explicitly, this phenomenon is more 
likely to be picked up by implicit measures like the IAT 
(Rudman, Feinberg, & Fairchild, 2002). In Study 2, Black re­
spondents showed a favorable explicit Aad for ads featuring 
their in-group, yet they also displayed an automatic response 
with no positivism for their in-group. This devaluation of 
one’s in-group increases as the status of the minority group 
decreases so that the lower the status of a minority group, the 
lesser the automatic preference for one’s in-group (Rudman 
et al., 2002). In the case of very low status groups, this im­
plicit acceptance of social prejudice can even lead to more fa­
vorable associations with the out-group (Rudman et al., 
2002). We would not expect Black students at a major univer­
sity to display such an extreme in-group bias. It is nonethe­
less striking that their automatic associations suggested a 
lack of preference for their own group. 
Finally, the supplementary data obtained in this study con­
firm the assumption that the IAT operates at the category level 
as suggested by previous research, and that evaluations of spe­
cific stimulus exemplars (e.g., liking New Balance) have no 
detectable effectswhen the classification task refers to the race 
of the spokesperson, and vice-versa. This is particularly help­
ful if one is concerned with isolating the associations for one 
concept, as it appears that as long as the categorization is clear, 
results should be resilient to exemplar level effects. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
In this article, we have reviewed the strengths and limitations 
of the IAT as a metric for investigating implicit consumer so­
cial cognition. In addition, we provided an empirical examina­
tion of the IAT’s validity and individual-level sensitivity in the 
implicit measurement of brand attitude, consumer–brand rela­
tionship strength, and attitude toward the advertisement (Aad). 
Finally, we showed that the IAT is able to detect consumer be­
havior effects that explicit measures could not. Our review of 
the literature and two studies permits several conclusions. 
First, explicit measures and IAT measures of attitudes and 
other marketing constructs converge when consumers are 
willing and able to report their feelings and beliefs. This con­
vergence was clearly evident in Study 1, where social desir­
ability or other biases were not likely to occur. However, 
IAT-based measures of brand relationship strength revealed 
distinctive asymmetries between brands, demonstrating that 
the IAT can measure other constructs besides attitudes. Study 
1 also showed that the IAT was sensitive to individual differ­
ences in attitude accessibility and strength. 
Second, the IAT can also capture automatic associations 
between target concepts and attribute dimensions that are 
distinct from explicit measures. In Study 2, IAT-based mea­
sures of Aad revealed an influence of ethnic preference on 
Aad that explicit measures did not. These findings under­
score the potential utility of the IAT in gaining a better under­
standing of the impact of ethnic stereotypes on advertising 
and brand attitudes. 
As discussed earlier, research on the role of unconscious 
processes inconsumer learningseems tobea logicalcandidate 
to benefit from the IAT in the near term. Research on Aad for­
mation, mere exposure effects, and classical conditioning 
(e.g., Janiszewski, 1988), could also use the IAT to determine 
if automatic or implicit associations between brands, ads, and 
attribute dimensions, behave as would be expected by these 
theories. Instead of relying on a lack of recall or other con­
scious processes as evidence that preconscious activities are 
present, the IAT can allow researchers to tap directly into the 
implicit associations that are presumed to occur. 
Unconscious and automatic processes should also be con­
sidered in other consumer behavior domains. The IAT could 
providevaluablemeasuresofcontroversialor stigmatized top­
ics. Past research investigating the impact of stigmas associ­
ated with volunteerism (Snyder, Omoto, & Crain, 1999) has 
shown that the public stigmatizes people who engage in so­
cially beneficial activities such as volunteering to help some­
one with AIDS. The IAT could potentially be used to expose 
the associations that drive these perceptions, such as an associ­
ation between AIDS and homosexuals, drug users, and other 
stigmatizedgroups.Similarly, theIATcouldbeused to investi­
gate how negative events that involve spokespeople can im­
pact attitudes toward the spokespeople and the brands they 
represent (Louie, Kulik, & Jacobson, 2001). In both cases, the 
IAT might uncover the automatic associations between atti­
tude objects and stigmatized attributes. 
Our results can be linked to other research on race and eth­
nicity in marketing. For example, research on consumer dis­
tinctiveness and ethnic self-awareness (Forehand & 
Deshpande, 2001; Grier & Deshpande, 2001) has examined 
the effect of spokesperson ethnicity and other ethnic primes on 
brand attitudes and persuasion. This research has discussed 
the presence of “unconscious ethnic processing and categori­
zation” (Forehand & Deshpande, p. 338). Therefore, it seems 
that IAT-based measures of implicit ethnic stereotypes, Aads, 
and brand attitudes, could allow further advances in this area. 
Certainly it is not our intent to suggest that because the IAT 
showed that White respondents had “pro-White” implicit atti­
tudes, marketers should avoid using minorities in their ads. In­
deed, marketing has long recognized the value of Michael Jor­
dan, Tiger Woods, or the Williams sisters as spokespeople. 
However, greater understanding of the role of unconscious 
ethnic processing (across ethnic groups) and its link to explicit 
components is needed. The IAT could provide evidence that 
even when explicit measures suggest that racial or other biases 
donotexist, consumersmayholdstrongstereotypes, and these 
situations might need special attention, educational efforts, or 
other interventions. 
Aside from race, one could use of the IAT to better under­
stand implicit attitudes toward risky behaviors (e.g., smok­
ing, drinking, condom use) because political correctness and 
social desirability might tend to influence explicit answers on 
these issues. Similarly, the IAT can be useful to study reac­
tions to companies’ social responsibility programs, and help 
better predict when and how “doing good will also do well” 
for the company (Sen & Bhattacharya, 2001). 
Results from Study 1 demonstrate the IAT’s usefulness for 
measuring the degree to which brands are a part of a con­
sumer’s self-concept. These findings demonstrate the IAT’s 
potential for advancing research concerning brand relation­
ships (Fournier, 1998), brand community (McAlexander, 
Schouten, & Koenig, 2002; Muniz & O’Guinn, 2001), and 
consumer identity. The IAT is also applicable to research on 
organizational identification (Bergami & Bagozzi, 2000) and 
would allow for new understanding and measures of the over­
lap between self-definition and organizational identity and 
newinsightsonits likely impactonothermarketingvariables. 
The IAT may provide unique and important information 
on other topics in brand management as well. Consumers’as­
sociative brand networks may include concepts and associa­
tions that a consumer either cannot or will not report, but 
which may surface through the IAT. Further, because a suc­
cessful brand extension or brand alliance would share at least 
some of the traits associated with the core brand (Simonin & 
Ruth, 1998), the IAT may expand our understanding of this 
transfer process. 
Ultimately, we would like to suggest that the IAT be used not 
just as a dependent measure, but also as an independent one or 
in conjunction with others. Much insight could come from us­
ing the IAT as an explanatory factor for behavior, choice, or 
judgments. Although traditional explicit measures often help to 
understand the link between attitude and behavior, the IAT 
might nevertheless increase the predictability of behavior by 
adding an unconscious or implicit component (cf. Maison et al., 
2004). In general, any context in which associations between at­
tributes and concepts operate at an implicit level would provide 
a suitable and necessary setting for the use of the IAT. 
In conclusion, the IAT appears to be both a valuable and 
valid measure of implicit consumer social cognitions. Of 
course, we have already acknowledged that the measure is 
not a complete panacea and that some limitations or concerns 
still remain. In particular, the relative nature of the measure 
makes it impractical in some consumer settings. Also, more 
is needed to be known with respect to the theoretical and 
physiological underpinnings of how the IAT operates. 
Finally, more evidence is needed to fully evaluate the IAT’s 
relationship to behavior and the conditions associated with it. 
However, it appears that the benefits and potential gains for 
consumer research outweigh these concerns and the IAT pro­
vides a much-needed implicit measure with strong psycho­
metric properties. 
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APPENDIX
 
Examples of Advertising Stimuli
 
Used for Study 2
 
Note that all ads were executed for both brands. This ap­
pendix contains examples of the stimuli used in Study 2. In 
total there were 32 versions created (2 brands × 8 sports × 2 
ethnicities). Actual faces have been masked in this appendix, 
but they were not masked in the experiment. 

